Who will overthrow Putin?
Which is easier to imagine? - Vladimir Putin suddenly announced the end of the war on Ukraine and withdrawal of troops? Or, will a Russia without Putin change its policies, end the war and start building relations with Ukraine and the West on a new basis of peace?
This is a difficult question to answer. The Ukraine war is largely the result of Putin's personal obsession, and he is unlikely to voluntarily agree to end it. This leaves another possibility: a Russia without Putin, where all hope for peace in Russia hinges on regime change.
This also seems unlikely. Six months into the war, Putin's power appears to be no less than in peacetime. His approval rating is high, and there is no opponent in Russia who can make a sound. His two most likely successors - Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Opposition Leader Alexei Navalny - one is bound by loyalty to the president, the other is in prison. For any one to take office, Putin must leave office. But he won't leave except on a sudden whim or medical emergency. Putin's successor is likely to be Putin.
This is a bleak prospect that many find hard to accept. Faced with a president who is driving the country to ruin, and members of the ruling elite who are themselves severely affected by the war, why haven't any of them pushed Putin to step down? Where are the brave technocrats or functionaries who will find ways to overthrow the president for the benefit of their own class and country? These questions, which are often discussed in the West, are more of a lament than a motivator for analysis. But the answer is in sight.
For years, critics inside and outside Russia have relied on one important theme to fuel opposition to Putin: corruption. For a while, there has been some progress in this approach, notably the work of Navalny, whose elaborate videos documenting the corrupt practices of the ruling elite, including Putin, appear to have eroded the president's popularity.
But corruption is the glue that holds the system together, not the catalyst that breaks it. Putin's power rests on the theft of his subordinates, and his goal is not to ensure their comfort and well-being. His goal is more likely to tie the ruling class into a collectively responsible conspiracy system, ensuring its absolute unity. In this complicity, no one can challenge the president.
Strictly speaking, it is not entirely correct to call such a system corrupt. Corruption is bound to deviate from the norm, and in Putin's Russia, officials living off unsolicited money are precisely the norm. Seriously follow the law and almost every Russian minister or governor could end up in jail. But in practice, Putin has always used the law selectively. Whenever one of his influential subordinates is accused of corruption, the main question that comes to mind is the political reasons behind the arrest.
Such was the case with former economy minister Alexei Ulyukayev, who was accused of accepting Igor Sechin, the CEO of Russian oil giant Rosneft and Putin's friend, Igor Sechin. bribe. The same goes for several governors, including Nikita Belek, who once led a major opposition party, and Sergey Fugar, whose electoral victory the Kremlin did not want, accused of The charge is not corruption but murder.
In Russia, so-called corruption should be more accurately called a system of abetting and extortion. If you're loyal and the president is happy with you, you have the right to steal -- but if you're not loyal, you can go to jail for stealing. It is not surprising that only a few people within Putin's system have spoken out against it in recent decades. Horror is always more obedient than anything else.
War has the potential to upend this calculation. The ruling class, which has gained wealth from being in power, is now confronted with a new reality: their property in the West is either confiscated or sanctioned - no more yachts, no more villas, nowhere to run. For many officials and oligarchs close to the government, it means the collapse of all their life plans, and it can be assumed in principle that Putin's thieves are more disgruntled by war than any other social group in Russia.
But there's a problem: they're getting those yachts and villas in exchange for political proxies. The fundamental conspiracy of Russian internal politics is related to this fact. Putin's military adventures have had a devastating effect on the lives of the establishment elites on whom he has relied. But the elites, who depend on power for wealth and security, find themselves unqualified to say no to Putin.
That's not to say their grievances haven't been exposed. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has spoken publicly about the difficulties of carrying out his duties in the new circumstances. During a meeting with Putin, Kremlin insider Alexei Kudrin, head of the state financial audit agency, explained that the war had brought the Russian economy to a dead end. Even Sergei Chemezov, the head of the state military-industrial monopoly, wrote an article saying Putin's plan was impossible. But without the backing of political clout, such views would not catch Putin's attention or put him at risk.
Indeed, wars often create new elites among officers and generals who may threaten the president's rule. However, this has not happened in Russia, possibly because Putin is trying to prevent his generals from gaining too much fame. The names of Russia's commanders on the Ukrainian battlefield were kept secret until the end of June, and propaganda about the war's "heroes" has tended to report on those who have lost their lives and can no longer express political ambitions. In any case, Putin is surrounded by security personnel he favors, and their loyalty is unquestionable.
In this case, Russian officials have no choice but to wait. They could try some sort of secret game of their own, including separate negotiations with the West, but so far there's no evidence that the Russian elite has a humanitarian corridor. Even if someone — such as Roman Abramovich, an oligarch close to Putin — manages to break into the West, all that awaits him is confiscation of assets and suspicion. Putin's paranoia may even be preferable by comparison.
If the ruling elite can't overthrow Putin, maybe the professional middle class can? However, this prospect is not optimistic. For those who have come forward to criticize the war, the fate of Marina Ovyannikova, editor of the state-owned Channel One, is instructive. During a live broadcast of a popular evening news show, she stood behind the announcer and held up a poster that read "Stop the War." After the high-profile protest, she fled the country to avoid arrest, leaving her family in Moscow.
For months, she's traveled across Europe and faced numerous accusations - no matter how impressive her protests may be, she's first and foremost a cog in Putin's propaganda machine. She returned to Russia, where she was arrested and fined multiple times, charged with spreading false information, and her home searched. Her former colleagues in the media and the wider professional community must understand that there is no point in imitating her behavior. Rather than risk bankruptcy and notoriety, watch the war at work.
At the mass level, the situation is not much better. The initially promising anti-war protests have been completely stifled by the threat of imprisonment. Now, it's almost impossible to speak critically in public, let alone rallies or demonstrations. The regime, wielding a stick of repression, has complete control over the domestic situation.
Instead, what is now a serious threat to Putin's power is the Ukrainian military. Only the loss of the front can bring the real possibility of changing the political situation in Russia - Russia's history is a good example of this. After his defeat in the Crimean War in the mid-19th century, Tsar Alexander II was forced to pursue radical reforms. The same thing happened after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Reforms in the Soviet Union were largely driven by the failure of the war in Afghanistan. A similar process could unfold if Ukraine manages to inflict heavy losses on Russian troops.
Yet despite the havoc so far, that transition feels far away. It is Putin who rules Russia now and for the foreseeable future — and the fear that things will get worse without him.
Comments
Post a Comment